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THE THEORY OF NATIONALITY.
Despite a long and brilliant history such as fate had in store
for but few of the many shibboleths radical and conservative of the
Revolutionary era, from the Declaration of the Rights of Man by the
National Assembly to the invention by Talleyrand of the principle of
'Legitimism', the principle of Nationality is today so far from being
regarded as an ultimate ideal, that in many quarters it is subjected,
in respect of many of its tendencies, to the most hostile ana unspar¬
ing criticism. The survival and successes of the theory have not besx
unopposed; nd nation-patriotism has only emerged triumphant from its
arduous conflict with state-patriotism at the cost of increasing
narrowness and exclusiveness in the sentiment of loyalty. Nationality-*
we shall find, has been based as much on hate as on love.
Thoughts# century of active life can be conceded to the principle
of nationality as a conscious factor in the mating of history, yet
nations and national sentiment existed in Europe long before the
French Revolution. As the memories of centuries of vigorous national
life within our own island (Ireland being comfortably forgotten) may
cause us to be surprised that the continental states did not at an
earlier date follow our example and assert the principle, so obvious
in our own case, that the limits reached by the 'folk' should be
accepted as the boundary of the state, we must emphasise in the
history of nationality on the continent the existence of two success¬
ive stages,, the triumph over two distinct forces—one external and
one internal. The people have in the first place to attain to
national self-consciousness, .and. the consolidated nation has then to
measure forces with the consolidated state, whose bounds have mean¬
time. been arbitrarily determined by the wars and by the caprices of
its. feudal, lords. The process in both its stages is closely connected
with-the progress of - democracy, and enlightenment. In its earlier
stages, social, and- economic; in its later, more purely political,—
the struggle of. the people., to be a. nation, and of the nation to be
free f rom-all external c-ontrol, — the history of nationality is the
history of modern European civilisation.
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Nationality, as appears from the origin of the word; itself, is
based on community of race, or rather on the Recognition of common
rieBcftTnt. which, in general, will involve a community of language, and
in later times a common literature.
This literature itself may become an important source of national
feeling by fostering the sentiment of national unity. The common
traditions of the race, whether of glory or of suffering, form a tie
not only between past and present but between all the present sharers
of the ancient memories. Religious beliefs, when held in common by
the race, should also be included under this head as impelling to
unity. It may be recalled that the oldest of Greek historians,
Herodotus, made it the criterion of the limits of Greek nationality,
that Hellas was wherever men shared the blood, language, religion,
and manners of the Hellenes.
When a people has a community of sentiment, it seems to deserve tie
name of a 'nation';but to awaken an enthusiastic nationalism, the
impulse of a community of interest is invariably required. Nationally
remains dormant till summoned to assist 'the cause'. Drum and trumpet,
the 'trusty blade' and the 'grey goose-quill' are in earlier times
the instruments of nationality; and the military connection still
dominates its development in some continental countries. It has been
left to the nineteenth century, however, to find in economic con¬
siderations .another element of common interest — another method of
adding the-appeal of selfishness to that of sentiment; but indeed
modern international commerce is conducted on principles that have
many analogies to those formerly appropriate,, to a state of war. This
element of interest it is which supplies the dark side of the picture
of nationality; and once the interests of rival nations have clashed,
the sentiment of hate or fear comes to lend its inspiration to tjie
unbeautiful nationality thus developed.
In an essay entitled 'What is a nation?', M. Ernest Renan has
attempted to discover in one of these elements the whole foundation
of the principle of nationality. Taking a wider than merely national
view, he finds in the racial principle, not union but disunions races
are everywhere mingled, and"we have no right to go about the world
feeling the h^'i8 °f people, then taking them by the throat and sayiig
'you are of our blood, you belong to us—especially since the
development of ethnological science might p-ove that there was a
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mistake after all. This however is merely extravagant. M. iienan
was preaching against the incorporation of Alsace and. Lorr&intlby
Germany. When he says 'racial considerations, then, have teen for
nothing in the constitution of modem nations', he may solely be
ignored: when he really reaches sound principles, we may listen to
his disapproval of the doctrine that 'the Teutonic family... has the
right of reclaiming such of its members as are beyond the pale of
Teutonism, even when these members do not seek reunion. The right of
Teutonism over such a province is greater than the right of the
inhabitants of the province over themselves'. This is obviously a
good point; but what it proves is, not that nationality is to be
disregarded, but that national sentiment should be consulted. Race
alone does not make a nation.
♦Language invites reunion, it does not enforce it... In man there
is something superior to language— will*. This admits all that is
necessary for our point, and draws attention to one of the strangest
phenomena of nationality— the community of sentiment binding togethet
the cantons of Switzerland, in which there is no homogeneity of race,
of language, or of religion.
Religion 'retains all its importance in the spiritual jurisdiction
of each man; but it has almost completely disappeared from the con¬
siderations that trace the limits of peoples*.
Community of interest makes not a nation but commercial treaties.
'A zollverein is not a fatherland*.
'A nation is a living soul, a spiritual principle. Two things...
constitute... this. One is in the'past, the other in the present. One
is a common possession of a rich heritage of memories; the other is
the actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to preserve
worthily the undivided inheritance that has been handed down. . . To
have common glories in the past, a common glory in the present: to
have done great things together, to will to 0.0 the like again — such
ace the essential conditions for the making of a people '.
If the co-operation of the people be without a conscious sentiment
of solidarity, nationality is certainly wanting. but how is the
national self-consciousness to arise? Historically we find that on
the groundwork of racial unity the full consciousness of a common
interest has to be constructed ere the nation can achieve the chhesio-rv
and enthusiasm which alone can give success to its efforts. All tnes®
elements are found at -work not only in the creation of the nations,
but also in effecting the triumph of nationality in the nineteenth
century over the old state-system of Europe so stoutly championed by
Matternich and all who dreaded the return of 'tevolution'.
tNational sentiment is not always a spontaneous popular growth; and
in several cases the desire for national independence has required to
be sedulously fostered not only by the inspiration of the poet and tie
man of letters, but by the more material devices and cunning of nhe
statesman. The Romauitic movement sent poets and dramatists back to
the old heroic days, and every struggling nation in Europe derived a
stimulating impulse from the new literature and the old legends.
National interests, too, have at times been manufactured by the
statesman as a means to unity and strength. Thus the zollverein or
Customs Union served the cause of nationality in helping both to
exclude Austria from Germany and to attach the lesser states to
Prussia. When with the decline of Austria the national movement
ceased to be the concern of secret societies and secret presses, when
it passed from the hands of students and;-4ii-t'crs" to the practical
control of statesmen and diplomatists, then men like Cavour and
Bismark did not hesitate, in the pursuit of the ultimate good of the
-nation, to risk a transient unpopularity by ceding national territory
or by involving the people in an aggressive war.
The old state-system of Europe, which arose from the ruins of the
Mediaeval Empire, was based on force. But in few cases was the state
in any sense the governmental organisation of a 'nation'. Its true
represent?-iive was the monarch, to whose power Roman law contributed
the principle of autocracy; feudal custom, the doctrine of suzerainty;
and Christianity itself, the theory of divine right. The interests
of the state meant those of the Prince, not those of the people; uhoae
of authority, not those of liberty. Under the plea of the Miltonic
Gatan, 'public reason just,Honour and empire', perhaps in some cases
'with revenge enlarged', Governments added to the extent of their
dominions by wars and family alliances, by perfidies and brutalities
of every description, recking nothing of the heter'eogeneous nature of
the territories thus acquired. The 'enlighienea despotism' of uhe
eighteenth century was essentially anti-national, and it was those
very monarchs who sought to confer benefits on their own subjects
who were responsible for the thrice-repeated spoliation of Poland.
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The economic policy of the Mercantile system dominant in En-ope in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has been termed by List the
National Bystem: a much better name would be the abate system, for it
was not the national and popular interest$ of opulence and comfort,
but the political and governmental interest of defence and power that
■was the real object. The central idea of the system was that one
state's gain was another state's loss; and the object of such devices
as the Navigation Laws of 1651 was not merely to add to the commerce
and power of Britain, but also to damage those of the Dutch. in
politics, likewise, the state system sought for territorial aggrandis-
ment at the expense of its neighbours — a policy closely connected
with the concentration of power in the hands of the central authority -
the Prince.
Similarly, it is only by interpreting 'nation' in the sense of
'state'— that is, by considering the tie of a common government to be
sufficient to constitute a 'nation'— that we can reconcile the
arbitrary treatment, in 1615, of Belgium, of Norway, of the hhenish
Provinces, and of Venice, with such a declaration of the allied
sovereigns as the following,-'Nations will henceforth respect their
mutual independence® no political edifice shall henceforth be erected
on the ruins of formerly independent states; the object of the war
and of the peace is to secure the rights, the freedom, and the -
independence of all nations'. If we remember that 'nation' here
means 'state', and that it had not yet become ridiculous for a ruler
to say 'L'Etai c'esi moi', then it appears that 'nationality' is but
a paraphrase of 'legitimism'.
As in matters of commerce and industry, so in all departments of
politics the nation saw its liberties circumscribed and its interests
disregarded on the pretext of 'reasons of state', which in many cases
amounted to no more than the caprice of the personal ruler; and as
the middle class grew stronger in numbers, in wealth, in education,
and in political capacity, the time drew nigh when the old system of
repression must be overthrown. The struggle for political liberty,.
for constitutional rule, involved also a movement towards the assertio-w
of the principle of nationality. The initiative, as in the case of
so many European movements, was taken by Prance, which was perhaps tie
only continental Power which could be said at the end of the eighteen"^
century to have attained national unity and independence. For the
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other peoples of Europe national sovereignty was impossible until the
foundation of national unity had been well and truly laid.
Of the five great Powers which formed the Concert of Europe in the
early nineteenth century, France and. Britain had completed the proceffi
of national growth, while the nationality of Spain, though of equal
antiquity, was somewhat disturbed by provincial jealousies. The
three Eastern Powers were not only illiberal but also unnational or
incompletely national. In.every respect, of course, Russia was in a
more backward- condition than the rest of Europe; but why Austria
should, in the main,, represent Italy, and why Prussia should not
represent Germany, are questions less easy to solve. The explanation
of the-delay till the nineteenth century of the consummation of
national unity in Germany and Italy is to be found in the pretensions
of the would-be cosmopolitan Holy Roman Empire to rule both these
countries. Instead of forming large nation-states, Italy ana Germany
were divided under the Empire into a 'bewildering profusion of
principalities', the rulers of which, th-ough the real weakness of
the central power, gradually attained to a state of inaependence mo-e
or less perfect, so that disunion was prolonged till the nineteenth
century by the interests of the princes in maintaining the system of
particularism. It is easily to see how Austria as the heir of the
Empire should have become the champion of the existing status, the
overthrow of which would involve for her the loss of influence and
prestige, and the creation of powerful rivals.
The liberalism of the later eighteenth century was still connected
with the system of state supremacy. For Louis XVI, Joseph II, and
Catharine II, reform meant uniformity of paternal rule by an omni¬
potent government. What was sought was the extension, not the
diminution, of the sphere of the state. Lor did revolutionary France
reject the principle, for, together with the privileges and exemptiois
of the nobility and clergy,the old provincial barriers were swept
away in order that the now impartial authority of the single centraliS^C
government of France might be yet more absolute. The state, however,
was now in theory to coincide with the nation, and herein lay the
justification of the enlarged powers of the former. It was only when
the European Powers undertook to invade France in order to destroy
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the -work of the Revolution that the result of the identification of
state and nation became apparent.
In origin a mere vindication of the right of the French nation to
sovereignty within France, the -war was converted by the enthusiasm of
the nation for its new-found liberties into a crusade on behalf of
oppressed nationalities — a species of knight-errantry among states*
which was utterly foreign to the European system of the time. On
such a theory of her duties, France would find that to the making of
war there would be no end; but the very continuance of the war led to
a new spirit in the nation.
At first came, in 1795, the doctrine of the 'natural boundaries',
that France must extend to the Alps and the Rhine — a doctrine perhaps
-conflicting with nationality in some districts, yet, not without
justification if deemed necessary for the security of Greater Fiance.
The relation of this theory, a national aspiration founded not on
racial but on territorial connections, to the sentiment of nationally
properly so-called is thus put in aidgwick»s Development of European
Polity, - 'In any appeal to, in any effusion of, patriotic sentiment,
the characteristics of the particular part of the earth's surface
inhabited by a community occupy a prominent place; to constitute
the object of patriotic devotion the imagination seems to require
this embodiment. When we think of the 'sea-girt isle' of England,
'la belle France', or the German 'fatherland', we often do not
separate the community from iheland, but fuse the two into one notion;
and in more than one case this fusion has had the politically
important effect of making it seem natural and right that a portion
of the earth's surface separated from the lest by marked natural
boundaries should be the territory of a single state'. The craving
of France for the Rhine and Alps frontier has been throughout her
history a disturbing factor in European affairs. Two difficulties
stand in the way of the application of the liberal doctrine that the
people should themselves choose to whom their allegiance should be
given— the result might be to give one of the neighbouring states an
indefensible frontier which in the interest of security it could not
rightly accept; and again the rights of minorities cannot possibly be
preserved where the mixture of races is at all complicated. Unless
the will of the people is vigorously manifested in opposition to the
government, it is well to leave the settlement of border territories
to the natural ©au-s-e of historical development— that is, on grounds <f
expediency, to admit the old illiberal principle of 'Beati poasidentes.
Hoon, however, the tide of war flowed beyond the 'natural' boundaries,
of the state: from the worship of liberty the national spirit passed
to the cult of glory. Yet .Napoleon himself, despite his aggressive
policy and his system of centralisation, did much for nationality in
Europe, not only by promises but by his actual performances. He
revived the hopes of one nation in Poland, where he created the Grand
Duchy of Warsaw, and.of another in Italy which approached more nearly
a century. Again, in the Confederation of the jrhine he took a step
towards the unity of Germany, for the old Empire had been powerless
to express national unity in the face of the sovereignty of the
several compnnent states. His entire system of 'satrapies', in fact,
was in accordance with, rather than in opposition to, national feeliig
Yet he but flattered the Poles and Italians in the interest of his
own ambitious plans, and however far he may have meant to go in
assigning national limits to the states he should found, these.states
could never have been anything but dependencies of Napoleon. Htill,
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his influence was^stimulating one for the oppressed nationalities of
Europe, whether they saw in him, as in Poland, a deliverer, or, as in
Hpain, an oppressor.
It was in opposition to Prance, however, that the Napoleonic wars
were destined to revive in its pure defensive form the national
principle whose inspiration had made the armies o-f the Republic in
its early days so irresistible. National feelings was aroused
throughout Europe by the high-handed acts of territorial spoliation
-everywhere committed by the now autocratic power of Napoleon, and by
-nothing more than by his 'Continental system'. France no longer ga\e
peace and liberty to other 'nations': to all in turn she brought war
and humiliation: on all she imposed foreign intervention and dictation.
By the tyranny of Napoleon it came about that 'after id07/the roles
began to be reversed, the law of nations began to suppliant the law
of kings, and the states of Europe, such as Russia, Prussia, sweden,
and Bpain, began to recognise either by word or deed the principles
of national integrity and national honour. Even Austria, foremost of
the opponents of nationality in the nineteenth century, appealed
kingdoms of 'Italy' and 'Naples' than it had done for
fit
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before the war of i^dfit to the sentiment of German patriotism, and.
proclaimed, the object of the struggle to be the attainment of the
unity of Germany under Austrian leadership. hut deeper than the
change of tone in these governments was the actual feeling of national,
union in hatred to Napoleon's system created among the peoples themsgflts
From this time Napoleon had to face not only the resources of the
s^ate, but the whole force of embittered nations. Spain, never
-'blessed' with a strong central government, and scandalously misruled
by Godoy, lost little in thejoverihrow of the Bcurbon dynasty; but the
nation resented muoh mere strongly the imposition of a foreign ruler
by Napoleon, and risings occurred in all parts of the country. The
provincial feeling prevented the national action from becoming united,,
and perhaps disunion for once was strength, by producing a harassing
guerilla warfare over a wide area when a united Spanish army could
not have hoped for success in a pitched battle. With British aid
the Spanish nation was thus enabled to give to Napoleon the first
check in his triumphal career, the first warning of his approaching
downfall.
In Spain Napoleon met a new kind of opponent. Spain was rpain;
but his previous opponents had 'not been Italy and Germany; they were
in Italy and Germany'. In these countries the overthrow of the state
was easy and decisive: in Spain the nation was able to prolong the
struggle after-the downfall of the .state; and in Prussia Napoleon
was to find that where state-and- nation are united, the combination
has a vigour and.might unattainable where the state is no more than
a state. The Spaniards were undisciplined, unorganised, unenlightened-,
but they gave the world the lesson it needed. Henceforth the wars
are national, and Napoleon's career ceases to be one of unchecked
triumph. His 'commission was against states that were not also natio-nS.
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The formation of the theory of nationality was left to Germany.
In the War of Liberation the champion of the principle of nationality
was.the Prussian statesman, Stein, whose leadership of the German
unionists dates from the time when, almost simultaneously, Fichte
expounded in his Addresses the theory of nationality, and Spain
illustrated it in practice at Baylen. Fichte»s position may be
summarised with the aid of a few quotations,—in times of danger
'the spirit of quiet civic loyalty t-o the constitution and the laws'
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will- not...3.vail; there is need further of 'the consuming flame of the
higher patriotism'. .'A. nation that is capable, if it were only in
its.highest.representatives and leaders, of fixing its eyes firmly
on the vision of the spiritual world, Independence, and being possessor
with the love of it'-...will assuredly prevail over a nation that is
onl£ used as the- tool of foreign aggressiveness and for the sub^ugatitfa-
6f independent nations»,.. 'The first original and truly natural
frontiers of a state are unquestionably their spiritual frontiers.
What speaks - the same-language, that is.from the first and apart from
all human contrivance united by mere nature with a multitude of
invisible ties. It understands itself and may go on understanding
itself better; it belongs-to itself, and is by nature one and an
indivisible whole. Won can it at pleasure take up and mix into
itself a nation of foreign origin and language without (at least at
first) confusing itself and violently disturbing the even course of
its..development. Only from this internal frontier described by the
human being's...intellectual nature comes the limitation of the
territory as a consequence; and in a natural view of things it is not
the people who live within certain mountains and rivers who form an
that, account a nation,, but contrariwise people live together and are
shielded, if fortune arranges it so, by rivers and mountains, because
already by...a higher law-.of nature they are a nation',
-la summary, aeeley says - that Fichte made the virtue of nationality
lie-,'precisely in that union- oi past and present generations which
secures tor the -actions of men-an earthly immortality',—a view which
recalls the famous-passage-from Burke, in which not the kinship of t3e
^ineiabMrs Ofr-the-nation, -but t-he less -close relations of the citizens
of -th'e-i&tate are celebrated, ■-*. 'The state is a partner^xn all sciences,
akpaKtnership in 0,11-art:;-a partnership in every virtue and in ail
perfection. And as the-end of such partnership cannot be attained in
may- generations^ iv-becomes-a- partnership not only..between, those who
are living, but those who-are dead-and those who are to be born'.
'
■ Driven to- desperation by. the., exactions of Mapoleon, the Prussian
people gladly -welcomed- su ch dActsines^." !0;nd'-th.e.lp»rty of .independence
and unity urged them on by..praise of. the.'.German national character,
by appeals to a glorious past and encouragement for the present, and
by education and instruction designed tre inculcate love ©f God, king
and fatherland*. Biein's plans however were thwarted by hapoleon's
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demand for his dismissal; and though the abolition of serfdom may hare
promoted the union of classes, his scheme for military reform and
national representation had. not been executed. Prussia again fell
into the background, and whilst the stout resistance of the Austrian
people was rendered unavailing by the lack of resolution in the
government, and whilst Russia was opposing to Napoleon that union of
strong people and strong government which is well nigh invincible,
Prussia contributed nothing to the cause of nationality but the futile
and the more permanent and influenx,i£j£
;
_
„ _ _ ers. But the greatest writers of
Germany at this time were cosmopolitan: Leasing, Herder, Wieland,
and Goethe all deemed patriotism a morbid weakness incompatible with
our duties to other nations. Lofty as was the theory of the unity of
Europe, yet the practical measure of unity attained was that based on
the nation, and, unfortunately, on the nation supported by arms. In
any case, even in a 'federation of the world', tfee. local patriotism
would still have a place, and within the limits of the state there is
room for^local or ^district feeling. The Napoleonic system offered
to Europe unity in subjection: the anti-Napoleonic forces contended
for national liberty, which could not be attained wiihoui^divisions
and jealousies. Had liberty been compatible with the despotic' rule
of Napoleon over Europe, that would have been the more desirable
alternative: as this was not so, liberty had to be preferred to unity.
But if Europe was not to be united under Napoleon, its nations
must unite against him, and in the effort each might attain to
solidarity and cohesion. In August 1B0B Btein had written, 'The war
must be waged for the liberation of Germany by Germans', and this is
what happened (with Russian aid) in 1B13. Brates and peoples once
more co-operated in a fierce national outburst, and the eager
enthusiasm of national feeling at this epoch seemed irresistible.
Yet was its consummation in a united Germany to be delayed for half
a century, since, after conquering Napoleon at Leipzig, the 'nation'
had still to overcome the opposition of the statesmen and diplomatists
who caballed at Paris and Vienna.
When the Napoleonic era had ended, and the representatives of the
European states met at Vienna to settle the affairs of the continent,
they saw no means of guarding against a recurrence of revolutionary
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violence save by the repression of constitutionalism and. its new ally,
nationality; and by frequent conferences to consider the desirability
of suppressing any incipient disturbances of the peace of European
states. The fruit of the War of Liberation fas not the comity of
nations, but the Concert of Europe, an illiberal and anti-national
league of states.
..... When the nations of Europe, after the hopes and efforts of the
Napoleonic era had vanished, were given up once more to their reactio-)v«tr^
rulers -without distinction of race or sentiment, it remained for them
to make the history of the nineteenth century a history of conspiracy
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and revolution, of brutal militarism and fraudulent diplomacy, ere the
forces of repression should yield, as yield they must, to the wishes
of the nations for unity and for constitutional rule.
The complete revision of the map of Europe du~ing the last ninety
years is in the main the achievement of the principle of nationality.
The work of reconstruction has taken two forms, one aggregative, the
other disruptive^ and the newly-formed states may also be divided into
two classes, unitary and federal. Each of the three generations into
which the century divides has a character of its own.
From 1815 to 1848 governments are dominated by fear of a revival
of the revolutionary spirit, and the people by a general desire of
tranquility after twenty years of war. Yet this is a period of
preparation for coming changes, a period not distinguished by 'grace-
ful concessions' from above, but by a vigorous maintenance of existin
conditions under the jblea that any disturbance might be fatal to the
European system. Metternich's desire of 'stability', indeed, was so
unbounded that one might imagine that he expected, in accordance with
Hobbes's theory, that the dissolution of the state might mean a retun
to the state of nature and the war of every man against every man.
While Austria and Europe adopted a policy of severe repression
towards all liberal movements, reformers were forced to take action
under disguises; and besides secret societies avowedly political, we
have literary and antiquarian societies also Really political in aim.
--vfcco -
The wdr-k of nationality in this period is the achievement of two forte
of dissolution,- the creation of the Belgian state by its severance
from Holland, and of the Greek kingdom by the recovery of its inde-
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pendence from the Turks.
Holland and Belgium, united under the House of Orange by the
Congress of Vienna to form a string barrier against French aggression
naturally divided in race, in language, in religion, and in economic
-interests, remained a single kingdom only till ie30, when Belgium
revolted and was established with the help of Britain and France as an
independent kingdom. This was the first indication given to Europe
of the folly of trying to bind together diverse nationalities within
a single state. The monarchy had dynastic connections with Holland,
and the Belgians, naturally suspicious, found only too much cause to ■
justify their belief that the common rule was really exercised for
the benefit of the 'predominant partner', as in the time of Joseph li,
Catholics and Liberals found it easier to reconcile for a moment their
century-long feud and unite to achieve their independence than to
endure any longer the arbitrary rule of a foreign king. Fortunately
for Belgium, Britain and France were sympathetic, while the Eastern
Powers were occupied with risings in Italy and Poland; and the
doctrine of intervention in the interests of 'legitimism' could not
be enforced against the 'revolutionists'.
The cause of the re-establishment of the independent nationality
of Greece has special features of interest, as in this case the end
was only achieved by the aid of the European Powers, though each of
these sought primarily its own interest in settling the affairs of
the East, and allowed national considerations their full weight only
when insurrection gave place to a war of extermination demanding the
interference of one or more of the Powers and threatening the
stability of the European settlement. Hardy and adventurous, but
cruel and crafty, neither crushed nor conciliated by the Turks, the
Greeks responded widely to the call when the time for action arrived*
and they made so stubborn a resistance as to win the sympathy of even
the governments of Europe. To the success of the Greeks a great '
contribution was made by the folly and carelessness of the Turkish
government, which allowed the growth of a strong national secret
society, the Hetairia Philike, and (even more dangerous) the
development of Greek sea-power in the case of merchantmen armed
against the Algerian pirates.
1-i
The Greeks were really a half-savage people, not directly connected
•with the ancient inhabitants of Hellas, and having affinities rather
with Byzantium than with ancient Athens and. Bparia ; yet the mere
name of Greece was sufficient to stimulate a European sympathy with
the movement of national independence which would not, at least at
that period, have been excited by the insurrections of Bervia or
Moldavia. The Greeks took full advantage of the national traditions
of their country in appealing^Europen aid, and they met with great
A-
success. The Greek movement for national freedom began quietly under
the disguise of a revival of the Greek language and literature; and
this plan of disguising political societies as antiquarian, literary,
or philological was later followed in other parts of Europe. The
revolt of the Greeks had also other claims to the sympathy of Europe
as a rising of Christians against Mussulman oppressors of atrocious
barbarity; and thus on both sides sentiment was the strongest force
leading to the recognition of Greece\aj3 an independent nation. But
the interests of Austria and Britain in leaving Eu-o#e strong to
oppose Russia excluded from the new kingdom its natural adjuncts of
Crete, Thessaly, and Epirus, and prepared the way for further-
national agitation. These lands have been to Greece what Alsace and
Lorraine have been to France since 1870.
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In 1823 an application of the principle of nationality was made in
the fie? World by President Monroe of the United Btates, in his famous
message to Congress, which enunciated the doctrine of 'America for
the Americans', and whose provisions—that European Powers shall
neither interfere in the political affairs of the United Btates nor
found new colonies on American soil— have since been upheld in Mexico
and Central America.
It might also be maintained that the rising in Portugal in 1820
was a vindication of national as well as constitutional liberty,
being as it was a protest against a Brazilian court and a British
regency. The risings of 1830 in Rome and Paris were directed to the
acquisition of political rights within the state rather than to the
construction of a new national state; bjtt even within the first
period we come upon the name of one of the "greatest and most advanced
leaders of the national movement, Giuseppe Mazzini, whose activity
in promoting the liberty, independence, and unity of Italy dates
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from about 1830,
In the second period, that of general awakening and effort, there
are two stages. The first attack on 'absolutism' and 'legitimism'
fails because of the excesses of the reforming party —a result
paralleled in British history by the necessity of a second revolution
-against the Stewarts, and in France by the similar fate of Louis XVI
-and Charles x. As a result of the incompatibility of the desires of
all the reforming parties, the reward of victory was snatched from
them while they were already quarrelling over the spoil they had not
secured. But while 1848 served as a lesson to constitutionalists
and nationalists, the forces of absolutism were too elated at their
victory to estimate aright the strength of the opposition they had
excited. xhe great events of 1859, 1866, and 1870, which gave to
Europe two strong nationrstates, at the same time freed Europe from
the folly of a statecraft based on terror of international change,
only to deliver her to the uneasiness o£ a policy founded on dread of
war. The last date of this era of national reconstruction is 1878,
when the Treaty of Berlin added to the states of Europe two Christian
principalities wrested from the Turks. The great names of this mid-
century period are doubtless those of Cavour and Bismark, but it
must not be forgotten that the dominant principle of nationality was
also championed ' (against Russian aggression) by Louis Napoleon.
The period is remarkable for the extent to which journalism ami the
press were made to contribute to the cause of nationality; and
scarcely less so for the unscrupulousness of the methods employed
by the leaders of the national movement.
Nowhere is the struggle for- the recognition of the nation as the
political unit of more interest than in Italy. The progress of
national unity, checked by Austrian aggression, is gradually com¬
pleted in the course of half a century, during the first thirty years
of which no apparent progress is made. The Congress of Vienna left
Italy divided between a number of small independent states, nominally
sovereign, but all, save perhaps .Sardinia, under the reactionary and
repressive influence of Austria. Oppressive and unconstitutional
rule provoked revolts in Naples and liedmoni in i620 and 1621
respectively, in Rome in 1831, and in Sicily in 1848. But though,
till the latter year, no serious attempt to secure Italian unity was
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made, theorists, conspirators, and statesmen were already at work
elaborating schemes by which the claims of nationality should be
asserted^and Italy, from being a 'geographical expression', become a
Power in Europe. The scheme of Gioberti for the federal unity of Italy
under a liberal reforming Pope had for a moment seemed possible in
the first days of Pius" Ix., the opening of whose reign was marked by
a few measures of moderate reform and by an anti-Austrian policy.
But in two years these hopes passed away; and the republican party
also found it necessary to postpone their wild extremist plans in
favour of statesman-like schemes of the king and ministers of
Sardinia, the only Italian state ruled by a dynasty which could be
called Italian. The conspirators of the Carbonari had effected
little or nothing; the Young Italy party of Mazzini— a party which,
while repudiating the idea of appealing for foreigh assistance,
attempted, to harmonise the ideals of nationalism and cosmopolitanism-
had served only zo give inspiration and enthusiasm to the masses; and
when at last unity came to Italy, it came as the result of the
skilful manoeuvres of the minister of the only national state in
Italy, the state of Sardinia, which won the right of leadership by
the devotion of the ill-starred Charles Albert in id*6-9. From the
date of the second overthrow of the Sardinian troops at hovara, if n<&T
from that of Custozza, the crown of a united Italy was assured to the
House of Carignan. Fortunately for Italy, Victor Emmanuel found in
Cavour a statesman whose conscience in no way hindered his genius
from surmounting all obstacles. T.he fixst step was taken when
Sardinia posed in the Crimean war as the ally, on equal teams, of
Britain and France, while Austria by her temporising policy was
earning the hatred of Russia and the distrust of the allies. Mean¬
while under Austrian rule all Italy save Sardinia was subjected x»o
the worst excesses of reactionary government, and on the conclusion
of the war Cavour, at the Congress of Vienna, had the great satis¬
faction of laying before the representatives of the Towels a statement
of the position of affairs throughout Italy. Ho action was feaken
-upon this discussion, but it was nevertheless a diplomatic triumph
for Cavour, who persisted in his policy of sound, liberal administra¬
tion at home, and, the cultivation of useful allies abroad. He himself
declared the necessity of the union of constitutionalism and national¬
ism, -'It is impossible for the government to have an Italian or
national policy outwardly, without being inwardly reforming and
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liberal; just as it would be impossible to be inwardly liberal withou,
being national and Italian in all external relations'. Commercial
treaties, railways and public works, the suppression of clericalism
on the one hand and of revolutionary movements on the other, the
reform of the army and the creation of a navy,- these are the featur®
of .Sardinian policy in preparation for the inevitable war with
Austria. As Gavour gained confidence his schemes became bolder; ana
a national Italian society was formed to spread through the whole
peninsula the desire for national unity. The next step was to secure
the alliance of France, and this Cavour did not hesitate to purchase
at the cost of the cession of Savoy and Nice, whose people are nor
Italian in race or perhaps in sentiment. The war which Cavour so much
desired was almost averted in 1 by means of European intervention,
and when it did come it was prematurely closed after the victory of
Solferino by Napoleon's withdrawal in dread of Ge~man aid of Austria.
Yet Sardinia gained much more than the mere cession of Lombardy by
Austria, for the people of Parma, Tuscany, MOdena, and the iiomagna
had seized the opportunity to expel their opponents, and now threw
themselves on the protection of Sardinia, with which they are
incorporated in an already semi-national union. The will of the
people was in each case tested by plebiscite, and the European Powers
did not see fit, or were not enabled, to interfere. This -ac-e-e-s-s-ron
of strength however had to be paid for at the cosfe of the cession of
Savoy and Nice to the disloyal accomplice, France, which thus can¬
celled all possible feeling of obligation on the part of the new
kingdom.
The later stages of the growth of Italian unity make an exceedingly
-ugly picture. In I860 Garibaldi was let loose on Sicily and Naples,
and in the same year Umbria and the Marches were violently attacked
and torn from the Papal government. 'Such a violation of European
tradition was possible only because good government and the rights
of peoples were becoming of greater moment than the legitimacy of
kings or the integrity of states'. That the people willed the union
was deemed sufficient justification for these proceedings, more
brutal but scarcely more immoral than the earlier intrigues with
secret societies and revolutionaries. For Cavour himself, and doubt¬
less for his clleagues, the end justified the means; and it was
Cavour who said 'If we did for ourselves what we are doing for Italy,
we should be sad blackguards', —a verdict in which Azeglio heartily
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concurred, adducing the obvious parallel of the diplomatic prelimin¬
aries to the partition of Poland.
In 1861 'the first Italian parliament conferred, on Victor Emmanuel
the...title King of Italy, tut Papal Rome and. Austrian Venetia still
remained 'unredeemed'— emblems of the historic plagues of Italy—
the rule of the unprogressive Mediaeval Church and of the unpro-
gressive Mediaeval Empire. schemes for the actual purchase of
Venice and for the compensation of Austria in the Balkan peninsula
proved fruitless; and it was only as the result of alliance with
Prussia in the war of lb66 that Austria was finally expelled from
Italian soil. Though another Garibal&ian raid in 1667 was repulsed
by the French and Papal forces, the Franco-Prussian war of ib70
afforded an opportunity for the final seizure of home; and in the
next year the capital of the now completed kingdom was transferred in
accordance with the 'natural fitness of things' to that august and
ancient seat of empire. The state was free, tux, the Papal obstinacy
and preference for the role of martyr prevented the realisation in
its entirety of Oavour's ideal of a free churcih in a free state.
From 1859 to 1670 the process of 'swallowing' Italy 'leaf by leaf
like an artichoke' went rapidly forward, the rate of progress being
in (larked contrast to the repeated failures of the revolutionary
movements in the earlier part of the century. At the same time there
went on the process of obliterating 'particularism' and of fostering
the loyalty of the Italians to the new kingdom by the creation of an
administrative organisation based on the French system of 'depart¬
ments', by the unification of the commercial and educational systems
of the country, and by the facilitation of intercourse between its
various districts. At times there has been a movement rather popular
and revolutionary than statesmanlike for the liberation of the Tyrol
from Austrian rule. But Italy has already reached her 'natural
limits', and it is not probable that the Irredentist movement will
meet with success unless there should be a complete dissolution of
the Austrian empire.
The constitution by which Victor Emmanuel gained such popularity
in Piedmont remains the constitution of the united kingdom, and the
whole story of Italian unity is a notable example of the triumph of
national rights under the auspices of a constitutional monarchy over
the principles of the inviolability of treaties and monarchical
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legitimacy —a triumph wen by means of a diplomacy unscrupulous at
times in method, but ever loyal to the ideal of the formation of a
strong nation-state.
While the Italian movement ended in the creation of a unitary
staterand that of Germany in a federal empire, some obvious parallels
may yet be drawn between the work of hismark and that of Cavour. Each
was the trusted and powerful minister of the strongest native king,
whose dominions they were destined so largely to increase: each had
to expel kuasao^from the new state, and enjoyed at first the friend¬
ship of Prance though this in both cases changed later into jealousy.
In both cases the constitution of the dominant state has been applied
in some measure to the union, so that Italy and Germany are both
constitutional monarchies,- the former in the English sense in which
the constitution is everything and the monarch almost a negligible
quantity politically; the latter in a German sense in which the
monarch is everything and the constitution often"more honoured in
the breach than in the observance".
The contrasts, however, are still more striking. Germany had had
a feeble bond of national union for centuries in the Empire and the
Federal Diet, and the feeling of German unity had never become extinifc.
The Diet itself, however, had become an instrument in Austria's hands
for preventing any closer connection between the German states. lowef'
less itself, save to repeat to Germany the order of Metternich
'Stagnate, lest a worse thing befall thee', the Diet sought to
prevent the creation of any stronger central authority, and became
the representative not of union but of disunion. Italy, on the other
hand, had no traditions of union weak or strong in modern times,' but
the work of nationalists and revolutionaries had so far prepared the
way that Gavour through his whole course carried with him an
enthusiastic people, whereas the German nation had almost become
consolidated ere it realised whither hismark was driving it. Prussia
was also enabled by the peculiarly military character of her pre¬
dominance to incorporate in the German empire her non-national
territory, whereas Sardinia lost her trans-Alpine possessions in
becoming wholly Italian. Finally, whereas Sardinia paved the way
for the growth of nationalism by constitutional and administ-ative
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tdse salvation and unity
20
reforms, Prussia, in defiance of literal sentiment and public opinion,
began by .the reformation of her army and the silencing of protest both
I/rt.
in parliament and „the press. While Sardinia prepared an ally for
herself by opposing Russia in the Crimea, Bism&rk connected the cause
of Germany with that of autocracy by a league with Russia against
the Poles in 1863.
The dominions of the 'house of Austria', which had for centuries
enjoyed the leadership of Germany, had never been of a nature
sufficiently compact and homogeneous to furnish the elements of
nationality, and thus the attempts of Joseph II to find unity in
uniformity of administration were doomed, to absolute failure. Yet
the hope of consolidating even the most heterogeneous elements was
not abandoned; and on the fall of Napoleon, Austria sought territorial
compensation in Italy, and thus increased the unnaiiaijal nature of
her political system. Austria could not lead in Germany by virtue of
power based on Italian, Glav, and Magyar lanus beyond the German j^ale;
and the Germanisation of these territories was impossible, more
particularly by such unsympathetic and Macchiavellian methods as
were employed in Italy. In the Austrian empire the Germans were
actually in a minority, and the system of heedless acquisition had
its reward when Austria was forced into a vain resistance to the
tendencies of the age. With all her traditions of imperial greatness
Austria had nothing but disintegration to expect from an age of
national reconstruction* While it was the interest of Austria to
keep Germany and Italy weak, divided, and devoid alike of perso$nl
and political liberty, the policy of Prussia dictated a close and
permanent union of Germany under her own leadership. The days when
Western Europe required a champion against the Turks were long since
past, and, facing Russia on the Niemen,and France on the Rhine,
Prussia had become the obvious protector and leader of the smaller
German states. As early as 1830 Prussia was looked upon as the
natural military leader of Germany and the defender of the Rhine,
and three years later she had established herself as the head of a
wide economic union. The result of these tendencies has been the
gradual movement of the centre of the Austrian system south-eastwards
in the direction of Pesth, and the rise of Prussia, not suaden ox-
unexpected but inevitable jfO dominion over a Germany extending from
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Kiel to Munich, and from Metz to Konigsberg, and including not only
the German provinces of Hchleswig-Holstein regained from Denmark,
but also those of Alsace and. Lorraine recovered from the French after
the war of 1870-71.
The failure of Germany to attain a substantial cont-alised govern¬
ment in 1848 was due to the glamour of the Imperial t-adition of
Austria and to the victories of Radetzky in Italy. The Hohenzoliern
House still hesitated to take a step which should exclude the Haps-
burgs from Germany; and when the Austrian army retrieved her position
her statesmen acted fully in the spirit of the remark of ochwartzenbee^
when reference was made to Austria's obligation to xiussia for assistant
in quelling the revolution— 'We shall astonish Europe by our in¬
gratitude'. The death of Count Schwartzenberg ends for Austria and
for Europe the era of successful repression. Metternichism is still
the policy of the state, but the ability to support so retrograde a
system is now absent. In the Crimean war Austria attempts, as in
1813, to play a 'waiting game', and so to impose her own terms on
the combatants. But the result is the opposite of that expected.
—Instead of the goodwill and respect of all parties, she wins their
'-hatred and distrust. Bhe loses her prestige as the first of
European Powers, while her un-German interests become clearly evident
Her subsequent diplomacy, outwitted by Cavour and Bismark, does nothii^-
to improve her position, while Prussia advances rapidly towards the
leadership of Germany.
The diplomatic genius of Bismark is evidenced by the manner in
which Austria was induced to share the odium of the Prussian policy
with reference to the Danish Duchies, while Prussia reaped all the
advantages. Russia had already been won over at the time of the
Polish insurrection in 1863. Italy was induced in April 16o6 to
-enter into an alliance with Prussia against Austria in the event of
war breaking out within three months, the reward of the court of
Florence to be the cession of Venetia; and, finally, hapoleon III
was allowed to believe that compensation would be given to him"in
Belgium or on the Rhine for the accession to Prussia's strength which
would result' from the war. German opinion was hostile to Prussia at
this time, but Bismark possessed the strongest army and, in Molhke,
the genius who should direct its efforts to the right place at the
right time. Very judiciously Bismark endeavoured to place the war
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not on the ground of the Hchleswig-Holstein dispute — a matter of
merely Prussian interest; ..but. on. that, of the reform of the German...
Confederation, which was calculated to win sympathy for Prussia-not
only within but also beyond Germany. War broke out in the end of
June, and was concluded in seven weeks with the exclusion of Austria
from Italy and Germany, and the recognition of Prussia as the head of
a Worth German Confederation. i'he question of compensation to
Prance had now to be discussed, and project after project was thwartei
by Bismark. The unity of Germany was meanwhile promoted by treaties
with the Southern States, assimilating (in ie>66) their military and
(in 1861) their commercial systems to those of Prussia. Yet unity
did not seem likely to be attained in the immediate future by such
means, and Bismark resolved to force on a war with France. His
opportunity he manufactured for himself by the famous publication of
the garbled 'Ems telegram', by which he brought war out of an
incident thai seemed to be satisfactorily closed. Of success in the
war there was never any doubt; and the .South German states, after
sharing in the national glory, formally entered the Confederation,
and tendered to the king of Prussia the new title of Emperor of
Germany. After the successful establishment of German unity, Bismark
reverted to a policy of peaceful and not illiberal reform. Even
Austria was conciliated, and entered into an alliance with Germany
as early as 1872, though no formal treaty was signed till 187W.
The methods of the champions of German nationality are scarcely
less scrupulous than those of Cavour in Italy, and its foundation of
'blood and iron' may not prove the most secure that could have been
employed. The contrast is especially striking with the plan proposed
by the first German statesman, Gtein, in his 'Political Testament'.
His scheme would certainly have taken longer to effect its object,
but it might have proved more secure. Gtein would have educated the
people, Bismark awake their enthusiasm. otein's plan would have
produced a people better fitted to govern themselves, Bismark has
produced a people loyal to the principle of a strong military monarch'
The German empire, though it has won the favour of the nation by
its appeal to their pride in military glory, is yet not basea on
liberty; and it is perhaps now less true that 'Prussia is merged in
Germany', as Frederick William asserted on the occasion of his famous
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ride^hrough Berlin in 1B4B, than that Germany is merged in Prussia.
Bui the Prussian system must be liberalised if it is to be permanent.
The mighty masses of the German people cannot remain for ever 'under
the iron heel'. Nationality has been achieved, but not in alliance
with true constitutionalism. A 'paper constitution' does exist, but
German liberties are not protected as they should be; and when a weak
Hohenzollern succeeds to sovereign power, the German people will have
an opportunity of deciding the question whether permanence is
possible for a national system that does not rest upon true con¬
stitutional liberty.
The position of Austria^tod^y is a commentary on the fate of any
state which opposes the nati-enal development and independence of
nations. Not content with opposing the dangers of 'revolution' and
'Jacobinism' at home, Austria interfered in Italy and Germany and
throughout Europe in the interests of a policy at once antiquated
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and illiberal. 'The administration in Austria was not a systems it
was based on neither plan nor principle but on tradition and habit'.
But Europe at last could endure no longer the application of
mediaeval methods of rule in the enlightened nineteenth century;
and when the mantle of Matternich and Bchwartzenberg fell to Count
Buol-bchauenstein the hour had struck for Austria to be driven from
^Germany and. Italy, and to withdraw from the ranks of the Great
Powers to settle accounts with the many subject races acquired by
war and. royal marriages in the days of her prosperity when she was
the bulwark of Western Europe against the Turk. Not only has
Austria been forced to abandon Italy and Germany;she has had to
concede independence to Hungary, though both remain under one
monarch for the present.
Filled with indignation at the long period of inertia and depression
to which they had been condemned by the reactionary policy of Metter-
nich, the subject races of Austria-Hungary, - Magyar, Czech, and Blav—
stimulated by literary and sentimental movements led by journalists
such as Kossuth, Havlicek, and Gaj, rose in ib-*b to assert their
rights, national as well as constitutional; and the difficulties of
reconciling national claims in the mixed population at once became
apparent. The language question alone was sufficient to create
almost insoluble difficulties, and when the conflicting interests of
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Czech and German, of Magyar and olav, of Croat and Berb— none of them
in a mood for compromise or concession— had to be considered through¬
out the whole political system, Austria found it an easy task to play
off one race against the other, and end by conceding neither con¬
stitutional liberty nor national independence.
Austria's victories in 184:9, however, left her nominally united ~
and still subject to absolute centralised government, but bankrupt-
in resources and, ere long,, in reputation^ her rule the object of
detestation not only in Italy but in Hungary and the olav provinces
as well. From the death of Bchwarzenberg she lacked statesmanlike
guidance even on reactionary lines, and drifted into a position in
which she was no longer formidable to her foes. in every diplomatic
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encounter from the opening of the -(German war, Austria eenstantXy lost
ground, for from this time she was unable to rely on support from
Germany, while her eastern and Italian dominions were to her but a
source of weakness. Unable, from financial and military wea-kness-
as well as from lack of friends abroad, to take a firm tone in dealiig
with European problems, Austria still attempted to domrnate by inter¬
posing as arbiter when opportunity should offer. But this shifty
and indecisive policy led 'to such vacillations that Austria became
the object of distrust and contempt rather than of respect and fear.
Degeneracy and decay within the Empire prepared the way for the
liberation of Italy and the union of Germany.
The loss of Lombardy in 1859 led to the first spontaneous movement
of the Austrian monarchy in the direction of reform which had been
known since the Napoleonic era. After a transient movement in i860
towards the establishment of a federal state, a constitution was
adopted for the whole monarchy in February iboi, but the subject races
were dissatisfied with this concession, and as a protest tneir
members seceded from the Reichsrath. The constitution was suspended
in 1865, and negotiations entered into with Hungary on the subject
of the relations between the various parts of the dominions of
Francis JosBph. The question resolvea itself into an alternative
between Federalism and Dualism. Hungary, it was clear, must have
an independent parliament and ministry; but should the olav populations
be similarly favoured? Austria in the end declared for dualism, and
Austrian and Hungarian governments alike postponed the settlement of
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the claims of the minor races.
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The Austrian and Gisleithf|» Diet -was left under German control by
the •withdrawal of Blavs^ Poles, Blovens and Italians about i86fe» and
1870, and it seemed that Federalism was about to be established when
Count Beust was dismissed and the Austrian ministry restored the
system of German supremacy. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
in 1878, however, alienated the German liberals, and the gsve-nment
now began to seek support in the Czechs and Poles. The next few
years saw the Emperor and the nationalities gain at the expense of
the Diet. Again, however, the policy of conciliation was checked by
the violence of the Young Czech party in Bohemia f-om ie&O onwards^
and. the movement towards federalism ceased from that time.
In Hungary the tendency has been for the Magyarisation of the
whole of the eastern kingdom. Croatia was given a liberal measure
of self-government in 1875, but Transylvania was incorporated in-*bhm
Hungary; and in more recent times the Croats have^ suffered from the
exclusive policy of the dominant race.
The union of Austria-Hungary is not a product of the post-Napoleonic
treaties, but though the countries have a longer connection yet their
separate interests appear to be greater than those they share. The
establishment of the Dual Monarchy in 1867 greatly attenuated the
connecting link, and, though it has outlasted the nineteenth century,
-it is still doubtful whether this form of relationship will have so
long a life in the East as it had in the North of Europe, despite the
fact that both Austria and Hungary have now liberal constitutions.
Yet neither Austria nor Hungary would be freed altogether from
racial troubles by a complete separation. Hungary would still have
the Croats, Roumanians, and Herbs to conciliate or repress. Austria
-would doubtless still be distracted by the grand'rivalry of German
-and Hlav and the 'petty'rivalries of the weaker races — Illyrians in
Istria and Dalmatia, Poles in Galicia, and Czechs in Bohemia. These
subject races are at present fairly well treated by the German
government of Austria and the Magyar government of Hungary; but in
the event of a political upheaval they would probably seek a greater
measure of political independence. The Pan-Hiavic movement may
result at last in the creation of another strong state in south-east emu.
Europe, though the western states are not likely to allow the great
Blav Power, Russia, to find her profit in any disturbance of the
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elements of the Austro-Hungarian system. The Federalist po-lAoy,
which, opposed the establishment of Dualism as a compromise with the
principle of nationality, has become stronger, and the repeated
difficulties between the two parts of the dominions make it probable
that the ultimate solution of the problem will partake of the nature
of a Federation.
The case of Norway and Sweden is closely analogous to that of
Austria-Hungary in some respects, and may, at the sacrifice of
chronological order, be introduced here. As an arbitrary union of
two countries long dissevered it scarcely parallels the long common
history and tradition of Austria-Hungary; but in the adoption of the
system of a single kingship with separate administrations, the com¬
parison is obvious. Norway only submitted after a struggle in which
a British fleet assisted Hweden; and, after ninety years, the Nor¬
wegian parliament has recently declared the tie of common kingship
severed, and the union dissolved.
Dualism is a peculiarly unstable variant of federalism, as con¬
flicting interests can meet with no impartial mediation in a central
—assembly. The position in a dual state resembles that of the woman
republic when the death of Grassus reduced the triumvirate to a
partnership of two, Caesar and Pompey. When any infringement of
sovereign rights must benefit a single rival, the drawbacks of a
a system of co-operation become more apparent than its advantages.
Pleasant and unusual circumstances in the case of Norway a^-e the
peaceful nature of the separation and*the /relations maintained
between the kingdoms since the removal of all formal connections.
The goodwill of the Powers enabled several other nations to follow
the example of Greece at a later period in the century, and to break
away from the misgtvernment and confusion of Turkish rule, though this
emancipation was delayed for twenty years by the Urimean war.
Boumania, which had been formed in 1662 by the union of Moldavia
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and Wallachia in spite of British and Austrian opposition, received
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recognition's a sovereign state -from the Jb owe n .in in67y-arad oervia
af wer rhe Kusso-Turkish war of 1677-6," while Bulgaria^ became sm
automatoub- subject to Turkish suzerainty; and eight years later-




the Powers had separated from it in 1878. In these cases, however,
the desire to weaken Turkey or to save the revolted provinces from
misrule was a stronger motive than the desire to uphold the theory
of nationality. Btill, the result was a triumph for that principle,
and shows that in every quarter of Europe the general trend of modern
history has teen towards its vindication. The annexation/rf£ Bulgaria
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1a$: 1881-.QifcEBiatom noumol.-fra in the face of Russian and Bervian
opposition is a better, because more spontaneous, example of the true
work of the theory of nationality, while the establishment of RoumanJa
and Bervia as kingdoms in the feme "yearJy4as a confirmation for Eastea
Europe of the alliancd already established in the new western states
between nationality and constitutional monarchy.
France was already in 1789 in possession of a compact and homo¬
geneous nationality, yet in that period of the nineteenth cgentury in
which the process of nationrbuilding was most actively in progress,
no state is more immediately interested in. the success or failure of
the schemes than France. Basing his claim to sovereign power, like
the earlier Emperor, on the theory that he represented the 'nation',
Louis Napoleon was also the champion in Europe of that principle of
nationality which had been so utterly disregarded by his uncle's
conquerors in the European settlement of 1815. Yet so half-hearted
and ineffectual was his action, and so fatal the results to himself
and to France that Napoleon III has been described as 'the sport of
national forces which he had helped to create but which he was power¬
less to control'. His achievements were by no means trifling, but
their effect was scarcely in any respect beneficial to France. Louis
Napoleon was chiefly responsible for the recognition of the national
-runity of the Christian provinces of the Danube, Moldavia and
Jallachia under the new title of Roumania, which suggested the Italie-
origin of the people. He also assisted Italy in her progress to
national solidarity; but proving himself a mercenary and wavering
ally, he lost all claim to the gratitude and respect of the friends
of freedom as well as to the favour of the upholders of absolutism.
The price of his assistance, Bavoy and Nice, brought the frontie-s
of France to the Alps; and it was his great desire to complete the
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expansion of France to her natural boundariesabetting Irussia in
her advance to the headship of a united Cermany. But as he had
abandoned. Sardinia when her revolutionary progress in the centre and
-south of Italy had become too rapid, so also he preferred that
Prussia's new dominions should cover only the north of Germany.
Napoleon failed to secure the Rhine boundary by a peaceful revision
of 'the treaties' at a European Congress; and even after Prussia's
leadership in Germany had been achieved without French influence,
Bismark refused the concession which Napoleon believed he had been
promised. It was to his desire for compensation for the increase of
German power that the war of lbl70 was due, to the inconsistency of his
previous policy that he lacked allies, to the illiberal and incapable
/
character of his government that the debattle was so speedy.
In the branches of his national policy which less immediately
concerned the actual strength of France, his policy was no less fut-iJe j
no less damaging to the prestige of the government. In Poland alone
the Treaty of Vienna had given some sanction to the principle of
nationality, and in 1B63 Napoleon for once appeared in the role of
upholder of 'the treaties' against the arbitrary measures of Lussia.
Yet his intervention went no further than protest, for Prussia was in
complete sympathy with Russia, and France could not ~ely on British
or Austrian assistance.
The Mexican adventure of Napoleon was even more disastrous to his
reputation. For the formation of a united Germany and a united Italy
on the frontiers of France, Napoleon sought compensation not only in
the expansion of France to the Rhine and the Alps but also in the
-headship of the Latin races, which would leave France dominant in
Europe. Neither to Sardinia nor to Prussia did he at first wish to
t-grant supremacy over the whole of their national territory; in each
case he had wished to establish over the smaller states of the south
a French protectorate. That scheme had failed in Italy, and was stiH
to fail in Germany, when Napoleon embarked on the wider scheme of
Wxp^&da^ig the power of the Latin race to America. Io rapid had been
the progress of the United Liates that a spirit of emulation was
..excited, while the civil strife of Federal and Confederate afforded
-an excellent opportunity of vigorous action in Mexico. But adequate
support was not given to the expedition, and when, on the conclusion
of the civil war, the United otates applied the Monroe doctrine and
demanded the withdrawal of the French troops, Napoleon had to
acquiesce in an ignominious desertion of the cause he had espoused.
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His Mexican, pojfcicy illustrates tie devotion of Napoleon to a principle
of racial agglomeration wider even than that usually understood by
the term nationality, and more nearly approaching the idea of imperial
Federation.
The second period, which ended in ld'7d, left the European system
almost entirely reconstructed according to the principle of nation¬
ality. dome details were left for a later period to supply, and while
Norway and oweden have since agreed to separate, problems of nation¬
ality still confront the statesman in Poland, Austria-Hungary, and
Ireland. The theory still dominates as theory, but its recent
history is one of development in thought rather than in action. The
device of federal government and the 'annihilation of space' by
inventions increasing the celerity of communications have rendered it
possible to extend the principle of national unity to colonies or
kindred races no matter how far removed; and if we have as yet no
instance of such harmonising of the spirits of nationality and
empire, the question has at least been broug&t within the scope of
practical politics. How far such wider union may tend to widen views
and extend sympathies must be determined ere one can pronounce
judgment on this extension of the principle of nationality.
The tendency of m^odern times to democracy, to the recognition of
the nation as a factor in political calculations, is also connected,
both as cause and effect, with the achievement of national unity and
the development of national sentiment. The transfer of sovereign
power from the absolute ruler to the popular will is closely related
to the substitution of loyalty to the nation for loyalty to the
personal ruler.
The novelty of the French devolution theory lies in the doctrine
that the state must truly represent the nations in the eighteenth
century the state had come to represent no more than the governing
class. Henceforth nation and state were to be one, and their identity
was to be a source of strength in encountering both internal
difficulties and perils abroad. From this time, then, the feeling
of the nation could not be ignored, and future historians at least
will have to take account of that public opinion which in the period
of paternal governments was so inconspicuous as rarely to attract the
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notice of the chronicler of a history purely political.
'It is impossible to express and confine a Nation's history merely
_in terms of the state', and there (alreadjKjtag, arisen a school of
historians to do justice to the history of the people. J.a.Green's
History of the English People ±» written in the belief 'that it was
the great impulse of national feeling, and not the policy of states¬
men, that formed the groundwork and basis of the history of nations',
may be taken as the foremost example of the new attempt to write the
history not so much of court and camp as of the home and the market¬
place. £A state', he says, 'is accidental; it can be made or unmade,
and is no real thing to me. But a nation is very real to me. That
you can neither make nor destroy'. History written on such principles
is likely to be of particular value to the average citizen; and in
this age of specialisation, an idea so peculiarly modern and democratic
as a 'History of the People' is by no means likely to yield to the
demand that history must become a mere magazine of facts for the
political scientist.
The force still retained by the sentiment of nationality at least
in this country, is evidenced by the expression of the general feeliig
in various departments of literature, and notably in the hatred of
Russia cherished by such poets as Bwinburne and William Watson. The
spirit of liberty is wrth these writers conjoined with that of
patriotism: in others the imperial spirit has been predominant, but
throughout the works of almost all our recent writers is to be found
a pride in the national destiny, and in most a recognition of nations!
^responsibilities.
In its whole mission the principle of nationality has had no
bitterer enemy than Russia. Austria was indeed the protagonist of
Reaction at a time when the Cizar Alexander favoured a liberalising
policy, but Russia under that monarch and his successors has surpasses!
her instructor in the policy of repression. Austria and uussia,
-having accepted the doctrine that mere extent of territory is a
source of strength, awoke too late to the fact that to be strong the
state must also possess solidarity. To attempt to attain this by
liberal methods has seemed to them absurd, as history teaches that
nationalities which have become self-conscious are not easily con¬
ciliated by compromises or half measures. The policy adopted,there¬
fore, both by Austria and by Russia has been that of attempting to
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create a new unity in uniform subjection to a strong central govern-
ment. Had the territories^pooDosoed- by either of these countries
possessed in common the elements from which a nationality could be
constructed, there would have been no necessity for the rulers to
have-recourse to illiberal methods of rule, but nationalisation is
impossible where it means the unification of existing and mutually
jealous nationalities.
Russia's attitude towards the lesser nationalities within the
borders of her empire has been one of uncompromising hostility, and
in external politics s>ie has only favoured the principle when her
interest obviously dictated such a course, as in the case of the
Danubian Principalities, whose independence was expected to weaken
Turkey, and to render themselves amenable to Russian influence. The
territory gained by Russia from Sweden, Turkey, and Poland between
1700 and 1815 she had endeavoured to Russify by methods which have
revolted the mind of the liberal Powers of Western Europe and of
America; and have done much to win for Russia the cordial dislike
not only of advanced thinkers but of all believers in the rights of
man. In addition to the case of Poland, which may be taken as
typical, we have the introduction of the system of creating a Russian
province by the suppression of a nation, in Oourland, Livonia, and
Esthonia (the Baltic Provinces) in lsb5, and the extension of the
system to Finland in lb9b,- while in the south the treatment of the
Armenians has excited no less bitter antagonism.
The suppression of the national language and of liberal culture
in these provinces continues today, as does the plan of administration,
by Russian officials, so that in the east of Europe at least, nation¬
ality has gained less than constitutionalism. The creation in these
provinces of a sentiment of Russian nationality would seem to be a
hopeless task; and the defence that the wider sentiment must be made
to prevail is inadmissible where that larger patriotism cannot exist.
Of constitutionalism Russia has seen some fitful gleams in the
creation of the Zemstvos or district parliaments, and in the emanci¬
pation and. encouragement of the rural population.
For Europe the case of Poland, thanks to its great traditions and
its cruel sufferings at the hands of Russia, Austria, and Prussia in
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the eighteenth century, must always be of the highest interest; but
in dealing -with it, it must be remembered thai the treatment is not
unique, but part of the regular Russian system.
The triumph of nationality in the nineteenth century finds two
notable exceptions — the case of Poland and„ Ireland. in both cases
it would not be too much to say that the 'nation' itself is largely
to blame for this. An inability to compromise and an exceptional#®
facility in conspiring have characterised both of these peoples, and
led them to refuse large measures of political freedom. Both have
enjoyed and abused liberties, and 'reasons of state' are strong
against their restoration. Yet in accordance with the liberal
doctrine of nationality it must be admitted that Ireland, no less
than Poland, has a right to demand self-government; but wafere logical
consistency and political expediency conflict, there is, unfortunately,
no doubt as to the issue.
In IB15 Poland was made a separate kingdom, though subject to the
Czar; and in 1818 the Diet, elected under a liberal constitution, was
opened by Alexander. The Poles however set about the old work of
plotting and obstruction, and in 1823 the constitution was suspended,
to be regranted only with restrictions in 1826. Nicholas on his
accession violated the constitution by the appointment of Russian
officials, and in 1830 the Polish 'nation'— the aristocracy of the
greater and lesser landowners, that is to say,— broke out in open
rebellion on the news of the July revolution in Paris. By attempting
to negotiate and delaying warlike operations, the Poles played into
the hands of Nicholas, who was by no means inclined to parley with
the forces of 'Jacobinism'. The want of a middle class, a political
danger emphasised by Aristotle, once again proved fatal to the Polish
rising. The peasants had no enthusiasm for the cause; Austria,
Britain, and France did not intervene, though in all these countries
sympathy was generally on the side of the.Poles. The war at an end,
Poland ceased to be a kingdom, and became a province of the Russian
empire, retaining however a separate jurisdiction and administrative
machinery.
fJtill the movement for complete independence persisted, and the
feeble concessions of native administration in local affairs made in
1862, when Gonstantine was sent to Warsaw, only stimulated the desirs
for further concessions. The movement was fostered under the auspicey
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of the Agricultural Society, a body rather political than economic,.
• irtr -
and a bid was made for the support of the serfs by a petition,tey-b&W! m0Aa^i IVVO (purt^ei + vkx UZxtC^ . Denary ,5^4^00/ . ^ -vtM* t-~so4lsfw a. kohtCsvl A' /A r-Caltriuh-"
Polos for the roe toration of the oenstitution.^hd a r ecrui ting law
establishing conscription in Poland for the Russian army, the levy to
be made exclusively on the revolutionary town population. This
measure led immediately to the insurrection; and the indifference of
the peasantry, the alliance of Prussia, and the neutrality of the
rest of Europe, gave Russia an easy victory, which was followed up by
severe measures of repression. In 1B6<± Russia in turn made a bid for
the favour of the peasants by a measure of emancipation much more
liberal than that which had just been applied to Russia. By con¬
tinued blows at Polish independence and nationality, however, and by
the repression of all literal culture, Russia has more recently
exhausted any gratitude that could have teen called into existence
by her agrarian legislation; and when Poland at last finds a leader,
he will noi lack followers from all the elements of a people now for
the first time deserving the name of 'nation'.
The feudal states of the Middle Ages — the United provinces, the
Bwiss cantons, and the Hanse towns - arose from combinations of weak
states to secure their independence of some strong and acquisitive
neighbour. In union each group found a vast increase of strength
and influence as regards foreign affairs, while in no case was the
central tie of a nature to restrict local liberties.
In Switzerland we encounter one of the most difficult questions in
connection with nationality— the reconciliation of the local witd- ~tL
central demand^ for patriotic devotion in the case of a federation.
The Congress of Vienna left Switzerland a loosdly compacted 'bundle of
states', but the force of circumstances led in 1B43 to a severance of
the tie by seven Catholic states whose ultramontane and reactionary
policy could not be reconciled with that of the majority. As was to
be expected, the central government, weak as it was, resented this)
and, thanks to the diplomatic delays of Palmerston, the other cantons
had time to snatcfe the victory ere Europe could be induced x,o inter¬
fere. The result of the Sonderbund war, in ibi7, was the establish¬
ment of a new liberal constitution creating a strong confederation
in place of the weak federal union. Rational patriotism was, as in
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the American Civil War, decided to Toe above local patriotisms the
interest of the majority dominates — by force, if need be. The rights
of the minority in such a case are not as yet admitted to exist ; and
here the principle of nationality may seem adverse to liberty, though
there is a possibility that if confederations become larger and larga:,
the tendency to be loyal to the largest union might be stimulated into
a movement for cosmopolitanism.
The case of Switzerland as a nationality is unique. it has a free
republican constitution, yet no community of race, language, or
religion. There is doubtless community of common interest between
the various cantons German, French, and Italian; but it is doubtful
whether even this and the sentiment of national unity due to historian
connections could long preserve the 'nation' from being engulfed by
by its monarchical neig/i.bpurs, werg not the republic guaranteed by
treaties. The swiss have no 'nationality' of their own properly
speaking; yet they have developed a national sentiment; and the con¬
venience of having a national state between France, Italy, and Germany,
has led to this exceptional case of a 'national' union between diverse,
elements—a union based not on race, but on sentiment and interest
alone. The case of Switzerland thus illustrates the gradual growth,
where local liberties are duly respected, of a federal patriotism
which overshadows but dies not supplant the old exclusive local feeliig^
so that it has been claimed by sidgwick that the distinction between
a 'confederation of states' and a 'federal state' is one of time only,
these being successive stages in the growth of federalism. Gould this
process be expected to repeat itself in the case of largerf"unions, we
might have hopes of nationality leading upwards to cosmopolitanism;
but as has been noted, ardent patriotism is rarely consistent with a
due appreciation of other nations —far less with love for them.
The modern development of federalism, again, is in most cases the
result of the demand of distinct races within existing unitary states
for a greater measure of independence. wherever the racial components
of the state are more than usually complex, federality becomes the
only method of satisfying their claims to self-government without
destroying altogether the coherence of the state. Federalism thus
'realises the maximum of liberty compatible with order'. inhere
exactly the line should be drawn which gives a minority a claim to
liberties as a 'nation', it would be difficult to determine precisely.
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If we are to concede self-government to Celtic and Catholic Ireland,
must we not free Baxon and Protestant Ulster from the 'tyranny of the
majority' within Ireland? If Hungary is to be independent of Austria,
why not also Bohemia? If Croatia has a parliament separate from that
of Hungary, will not the same reasoning establish the right of Tran¬
sylvania to a similar institution? The tendency of modern times to
'integration' is now being accompanied by a tendency to PederalityJ
and as more liberal views prevail, it is probable that the principle
will be extended in favour even of the smaller nations'.
At intervals during the nineteenth century Britain has been re¬
minded of the claims of nationality by the ever recurring outbursts
of disturbance in Ireland. The conciliatory labours of statesmen
have not been rewarded by a transference of that enthusiastic loyalty
which Ireland has so long cherished for her, own traditions. Priestly
influence has been exerted to distort the issue ana prevent the Irish
people from seeing the real issue save through the medium of pre¬
judice and hatred. The want of religious unity, and the policy of
meeting present benefits with reproaches for past injuries may long
-delay the coming of national homogeneity. Whether or not there is
real cause for alarm at the prospect of a grant of self-government
to Ireland is a question that admits of doubt even in those who are
well qualified to judge; and in spite of the most liberal theories,
no statesman would imperil the interests of the whole for the sake of
performing an act of 'justice' to a fragment of that whole.
But Britain has experienced more recently another movement akin
to, or identical with, the tendency to draw closer the bonds of
nationality. The limits of the British race are not to be found
(X/aa~X/+-^ca. ,
without surveying Asia, Africa,,, and Australia, as well as Europe.
Is it not, then, possible that a single state should arise whose
boundaries should include all these territories? Buch a state would
obviously be of a federal nature, while each of the colonies would
continue to possess local parliaments. Which colonies, which
dependencies would be fitted to share in such a union it would indeed
be difficult to determine; but the principle of nationality furnishes
the clue most likely to lead to a satisfactory solution of the problem..
The difference, at least, between the admission of the people of
Canada and that of the Hindoos and Mahaamedans of India is obvious.
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While the French Canadians of Q.uebec have already been Anglicised in
national feeling, such a consummation is not to be expected in the
case of the 'coloured ' races, and one certain limit is thus fixed
to imperial federation on national lines. The principle seems to
find general favour, but the difficulties are great; and the attempt
to create a basis of common interest on economic principles has not
yet been very successful.
The question of the beneficial action of the British Empire on the
backward races whose interests it has undertaken to promote is one
rather of state and governmental than of national action. But in
spite of European jealousy and detraction at home, the nation justly
approves and takes pride in an Empire based on the principles of
justice, freedom jmd progress. Judgment cannot in the present age
be passed upon state or nation without reference to its action and
reaction upon other states and nations, but where imperialism
involves on the one hand national expansion, and on the.other the
beneficent discharge of the responsibilities of a powerful and
enlightened people, there at least empire may be said to be justified;
and any endeavour to unite more closely the components of the empire
may rightly claim our approbation.
Mazzini predicted that nationality would prove a stepping-stone
to cosmopolitanism, but history scarcely bears out this idea. Hitherto
the process of national reconstruction has rather tended to foster
4r*r>(
hatreds by drawing the dividing-line^more distinctly, while public
opinion is apt to judge the actions of neighbouring states hastily
and from a hostile standpoint. Throughout Europe armed nation still
confronts armed nation; and with the expansion of colonial and
commercial interests in all parts of the world, there is constant
mea$ce of an 'incident' which will embroil Europe in a great war
through the operation of that public opinion which was so devoid of
influence under the old governmental system. Partly the coming of
democracy and of a cheap press and other 'improvements' —but partly
too the separation of nationality from nationality, the cherishing
by each of its separate traditions of glorious actions against its
neighbours or oppressors, have brought about the unstable condition -
of the modern civilised world, and necessitated the enormous armaments
37
which are preparer! for the eventuality of war at any moment. But it
may be hope*! that this phase will prove transitory. The character
of militarism impressed on all the great states of Europe is due to
Germany; and Germany's position depends on the p-0-faaUie-n of a strong
leader, for at present Germany is not free. With the subsidence of
the military spirit, there is a bare possibility that the tendency
towards national confederation might increase, and that the process
of aggregation might proceed on ever wider lines— a, British con¬
federation being followed by an English-speaking confederation, and
that by a Teutonic confederation, while Latin and Glav races might
also coalesce. But even if this should be the case, there seems but
little hope that such community of interest could be attained as to
-Effect the combination of these large racial units in a 'parliament
of man', a 'confederation of the world'. On the whole, nationality,
though apparently a liberal idea when compared with the old state-
system, does not appear to point in the direction of cosmopolitanism.
It is at present narrow and separative in its tendencies. one of its
foundations is not infrequently the common hate of a common foe; and,
while this is so, it cannot tend towards cosmopolitanism, a doctrine
of friendly feeling towards each and all.
'It was given to the war of 1B70', says M. B0rel, 'to prove that
—quarrels between nations have a more implacable character than
„quarrels between sovereigns, and that the principle of nationality,
so far from producing any progress in political morality, on the
contrary, leads men to return to the most barbarous practices?,,
The triumph of the principle of nationality was achieved at the
expense of the old idea of the community of Europe based on the
treaties of 1815 and their successive confirmations by congresses of
the Powers. The recognition of Italy and Germany as political entities
has involved the return of Europe to its old condition as a mere
-'geographical expression'. But better far that this should be so
__than that Europe: should be united under such a tyranny as that impoaetl
by Metternich in the years following the overthrow of Bapoleon. The
ideal of cosmopolitanism is the higher ideal, but for the present
—the national syatem is what is practical; and the practical ideal
for the men of today is that of a warm and healthy patriotism w&ich
does not engross all the virtues for one nation, ana leave only
despicable qualities to foreigners. ?Do not let us abandon', says
3b
M. Reaan, 'this fundamental principle that man is a reasonable and.
moral being Ibrng^ before being allotted, to such and such a language,
before being a member of such, and such a race, an adherent of such
and such a culture. Before French culture, German culture, Italian
culture, there is human culture'. This must be conceded, 'yet', says
Garlyle, 'the better thinkers mil see that loyalty is a principle
perennial in human nature, the highest that unfolds itself there in
a temporal, secular point of view; for there is no other kind of way
by which human society can be safely constructed than that feeling of
loyalty whereby those who are worthy are reverenced by those who are
capable of reverence'.
Owing to the instability of the states and the permanence of
nations, the theory of nationality has brought it about that loyalty
has become a thing determinate and unalterable. That a man should be
bound by sentiment, not to an abstraction or even to a territory, but
to other men, is also an advance in conception, and tends to make the
bond of nationality the true 'spiritual' tie described by Kenan and
Fichie.
The love of 'mankind in general' must in most cases be but a
feeble sentiment, and the extension of the affection felt for kith
and kin from the family to the nation is to be commended so long as
it is not accompanied by a contrary feeling towards those outside the
nation. Where national sentiment has been based on resistance to
foreign foes, the approach to the cosmopflylian spirit must be slow
and gradual, and must begin with a catholic tolerance of foreigners
ere actual appreciation and affection can arise. The ideal if
nationality would not expire even were that of cosmopolitanism
achieved. The affection of each man for all that is his own, that
has become part of his 'self', will make the famous lines of Bcoti
/
read true for hae® native land and one's kindred until the end of time.
The 'rights' of a nation as against its government are closely
connected with its 'rights' to independence from foreign control.
ks a nation rises to self-consciousness, it naturally demands that it
should be permitted to share in the management of its own affairs.
Hence we should say, and history confirms the idea, that nationality
implies constitutional rule. Even Germany has a constitution, though
it has also an 'over-mighty lord'.
39
The sovereignty in a national state will therefore rest with the
nation, lout there is no necessity that monarchy should be absolutely
abolished. Even after the large country^state has so firmly establisA^t
its unity on the basis of nationality that there is no longer any
need of a single ruler as the embodiment of the unity of the state
against the disruptive* tendency of an unruly oligarchy and the
theocratic pretensions of the Ghurch under a foreign potentate,
there are still occasions when the use of an extraordinary prero¬
gative in the hands of a single ruler is of the utmost service to
the state; the danger of resistance to such unusual measures is less
where they are supported by the dignity of a monarch than where they
rest upon the less august authority of the president of a Republic.
The history of the nineteenth century shows us the development of the
two principles together throughout Europe, the general form of rule
evolved being that of a representative democracy under a constitutionals
monarchy.
Bapoleon III held that the national sentiment was to be created
not by the grant of constitutional liberties, but by sound orderly,
government. Later the ruler might confer liberty on the people -at
his discretion, and could in this way add to his popularity. But the
nation was, at least at first, adequately represented by the person
of its prince, and the national unity and strength were in reality
unattainable save when the forces of the nation were thus at the
disposal of a single will. This theory seems to coincide with that
on which Bismark conducted the advance of Prussia to the leadership
of a united Germany; but.very different from these were the doctrine
_and the practice of Gavour. For the Italian leader, liberty was the
^mosi valuable ally of the nation-building statesman: for the French
_emperor and the Prussian minister, liberty was not the right of the
nation, but a gift by which the national sovereign might conciliate
or gratify his people. The latter theory savours much of the old
absolutism and 'divine right' of an age before the coming of the
modern democracy: the opposite extreme in theory was reached by the
Italian republican theorists and idealists, speculative and extreme,
^essentially unpracticaXSB. , who dreamed that the political system of
centuries might be replaced at a stroke by the uprising of free and
united self-governing nations.
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The theory of Gavour is the via media between these views, ana it
will naturally commend itself to the view of hritish moderation as
the statesmanlike plan. In early times when the disruptive forces
have not yet been overcome, strong centralised and even unified
government is necessary for the development of the nation; but
nineteenth century France and Germany had no- need to be thus kept in
tutelage, and hapoleon at last learned by experience thai the
government may delay too lon^iis politic grant of freedom to the
nation. Germany's military power and prestige uphold unshaken the
honour of the national state, but the future has to decide between
11*
the respective durabilities of systems founded respectively on the
people's will'' and on 'blood and iron'.
